| It was natural, then, for Maximus the Confessor to argue that “everything that derives its existence from participation in some other reality presupposes the ontological priority of that other reality”; 293 he meant the priority of the Logos of God with respect to all other created things which do participate in him. 294 The “hypostatic inherence” of the universe in the Logos of God can then be interpreted in Maximus’s words as the Logos’s eternal manifestations in different modes of participation by created beings in him. This participation takes place in spite of the fact that the Logos, is eternally invisible (i.e., ontologically distinct from creation) to all in virtue of the surpassing nature of his hidden activity. 295 But this participation does not assume any ontological causation; for to participate in the Logos means to be made by the Logos a participating being, that is, to be made as a being in the hypostasis of the Logos himself. This implies that existence through participation in the Logos is subsistence in his personhood, that is, the inherence in his hypostasis. In short, one can say that hypostatic inherence in the Logos is the same as participation in his person. Another example, which illustrates what the existence in a hypostasis or person means, can be brought from a sphere of theological anthropology, which asserts that “man is hypostasis [personality] of the cosmos, its conscious and personal self- expression; it is he who gives meaning to things and who has to transfigure them. For the universe, man is its hope to receive grace and to be united with God.” 296 The universe as the expressed and articulated existence is possible only in human hypostasis, that is, it acquires some qualities of existence if it is reflected in the personality of humanity. Using the words of Maximus the Confessor, every intellection about the universe inheres as a quality in an apprehending being. 297 The universe thus acquires qualitative existence in the being who apprehends it. 298 The link between the universe as articulated existence and the apprehending being is not ontological, but rather hypostatic or personal. A Patristic theologian would say that existence of the universe as the articulated existence is hypostatic existence, that is, the universe is enhypostatic. |
| 3285 Griffiths, «Predicate,» 315. For the more complex situation in Josephus, cf. Shutt, «Concept.» 3287 E.g., Dreams 1.65–66 (recognizing both as «god»); 1.239–240 (the Logos is to God what the parhelion is to the sun). MacGregor, John, xxxvi, acknowledges that Philo personalized the Logos, but thinks it functioned as a divine agent only figuratively. 3288 Dreams 1.228–230, in Hengel, Son, 80; Bury, Logos-Doctrine, 27; Haenchen, John, 1:109; cf. Borgen, «Agent,» 146. 3289 Cf. the practical divinity of Torah–experienced as God " s presence by Israel–in Sandmel, Judaism, 184. Justin likewise distinguishes the Logos from God while calling him God (e.g., 1 Apo1. 63, in Osborn, Justin, 30–31). 3290 Like Michaels, John, 7, we are inclined to accept both reasons for the lack of definite article, without determining which was decisive. 3291 Stuart, «Examination,» 41. Cf. similarly Bernard, John, 1:2; Ellis, John, 21; Brown, Christology, 187–88; perhaps this is also what Painter, John, 57, intends. 3292 Hoskyns, Gospel, 141, contends that John means more than «divine» because the Word is personal; while John " s usage elsewhere indicates a stronger sense of «divine» than many uses (e.g., Philós for Moses), Hoskyns " s argument need not follow logically, especially given Philós Logos. 3293 MacGregor, John, 4. Kenney, John 1:1 , argues that a trinitarian perspective makes more sense of the text than a unitarian one. For Jesus to be fully deity without all deity being identified with Jesus, geometric logic would represent Jesus as a member of the set «God.» 3294 See, e.g., Miller, " Logos»; Bultmann, John, 33; Fennema, «Only Son»; Harner, «Nouns,» 86–87; Griffiths, «Predicate,» 315; Harris, Jesus as God, 51–71,293. 3296 NEB; Bruce, Books, 247. An explanatory note may be needed on whichever side of caution one wishes to err; Harris, Jesus as God, 70, prefers to retain «the Word was God» but to explain that this means the same nature, not the same person. 3297 Irenaeus Haer. 1.1–3. On creation through angelic powers in gnosticism, see «The Apocryphon of John,» NHL 104–16; «On the Origin of the World,» NHL 161–79; Jonas, Religion, 132–36; cf. «The Gospel of the Egyptians,» NHL 195–205. Perhaps the emphasis on God " s creation of evil in Gk. Apoc. Ezra 2:9 may be antignostic. |
| To express the relationship between creator and creatures, the great Maximus the Confessor uses the old theology of the Logos as center and living unity of the logos of creation. The terminology already existed in Philo and Origen. But, whereas for Origen the logoi as logoi exist only in an essential unity with the one Logos, for Maximus their real and «logical» existence is also expressed in their diversity. The great difference between Origen and Maximus is that Maximus rejects Origen« " s view of visible creation as diversified only through the Fall. The «goodness» of creation, according to Maximus, resides in creation itself, and not only in its unity with divine essence. But creation cannot be truly «good»» unless its differentiated logoi, which pre-existed as «thoughts» and «wills» of God, are fixed in Him and preserve communion with the one «super-essential» divine Logos. 211 Creatures, therefore, do not exist only «as logoi,» or only by the fact that God eternally «knows them»; they exist «by themselves» from the very moment when God put His foreknowledge into action. In His thought, eternally, creatures exist only potentially, while their actual existence occurs in time. This temporal, actual existence of created beings is not autonomous, but centered in the one Logos, and is in communion with Him. There is a sense, therefore, in which «the one Logos is many logoi, and the many are one»; «the One is many according to creative and unifying procession of the One into the many, but the many are One according to the providence which leads the many to turn up toward the One, as their all-powerful principle.» 212 Paradoxically, therefore, the creatures are one in the one Logos, who, however, is «super-essential» and above participation. 213 «Thus, the logoi are to Maximus not identical either with the essence of God or with the existence of the things in the created world. In fact, an apophatic tendency is combined in Maximus with an anti-pantheistic tendency. . . . This is effected, above all, thanks to the understanding of the logoi as decisions of God» " s will.» 214 |
| The Logos constitutes one of the most prominent concepts in Philo, and its very prominence provides a diverse array of Philonic material for examination. 2951 In the early centuries of the church some readers of the Fourth Gospel saw Philós Logos as a forerunner for that of the Christians. 2952 Thus some scholars, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, opined that John probably derived his Logos doctrine from Philo, who connected Stoic, Platonic, and Jewish ideas into a new framework. 2953 Garvie, for instance, declared, «The dependence of the Prologue on Philo is so evident as not to need discussion,» although he believes that the editor adapted it to the Johannine theology of the Gospe1. 2954 Other writers were more cautious, some suggesting that Philonic conceptions were mediated to John indirectly through other sources, 2955 or that he depended on Philo solely for the term. 2956 While stressing the latter, Middleton thinks that Philos Logos bridges the gap between Greek philosophy and rabbinic traditions. 2957 Some think that Philo himself drew the image primarily from Judaism. After citing a rabbinic saying and the targumic Memra, Klausner urged that Philo «only broadened and deepened this Jewish conception and gave it a Heraclitean-Platonic-Stoic coloring.» 2958 Bernard likewise suggests that Paul and John on the one hand and Philo on the other «represent two different streams of thought, the common origin of which was the Jewish doctrine of the Memra! " 2959 (This suggested connection with the Memra would be mistaken even if the possibly later dating of this targumic tradition were not an issue.) 2960 Dodd summarizes numerous aspects of Philós Logos that may be compared with Johannine usage; some of the parallels appear significant. 2961 Argylés many close parallels seem to support his contention that Johns Logos doctrine is closer to Philos than to anything else, although even in 1952 he concedes that this no longer represents the most popular opinion. 2962 Given both Philos attested prominence in the Alexandrian Jewish community in the first half of the first century (with the likelihood that Diaspora Jewish apologists elsewhere used his voluminous writings) and long-standing Alexandrian Jewish influence in the Jewish-Christian community of Ephesus (the probable center of Johannine thought in this decade [Acts 18:24–28]), the logic of seeking parallels here is initially sensible: |
| Balthasar 1961 – Balthasar H. U. von. Kosmische Liturgie. Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners. Freiburg i. B., 1941, Einsiedeln, 1961². Dalmais 1952 – Dalmais I.-H. La théorie des “logoi” des créatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur//Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques. 1952. Vol. 36. P. 244–249. Karayiannis 1993 – Karayiannis V. Maxime le Confesseur. Essence et énergies de Dieu. P., 1993. Larchet 1994 – Larchet J.-C. Introduction//Saint Maxime le Confesseur. Am bigua/Avant-propos, trad., not. E. Ponsoye, comment. D. Staniloae. P., 1994. P. 19–24. Larchet 1996 – Larchet J.-C. La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur. P., 1996. Larchet 2003 – Larchet J.-C. Saint Maxime le Confesseur (580–662). P., 2003. Larchet 2010 – Larchet J.-C. La théologie des énergies divines: des origines àsaint Jean Damascène. P., 2010. Sherwood 1955– Sherwood P. The earlier Ambigua of St Maximus the Confessor and his refutation of origenism. R., 1955 (Studia anselmiana 36). Thunberg 1965 – Thunberg L. Microcosm and mediator. The theological anthropology of Maximus the Confessor. Lund, 1965. Tollefsen 1999 – Tollefsen T. The Christocentric cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor. A study of his Metaphysical Principles. Oslo, 1999; Oxford, 2008² Abstract Fokin A. R. The doctrine of the Logos in metaphysics and cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor: an exercise in systematization. The article deals with the place of the logos of essence in the metaphysical and cosmological thought of St. Maximus the Confessor. The author’s original classiication of logos according to the three modes: the ideal (logos as the Divine plan), the real (logos as the essence of a thing) and the mental (logos as the object of knowledge) is proposed. As divine intentions, the logoi eternally existed in God, and according to them God brought everything into being. At the same time the logoi are not connected with the Divine essence, but they correspond to the level of Divine energies and will. All logoi, both the particular and the general, are united in the Divine Logos – the God of the Son, who is both their center and the transcendental Primordial. In the created world the logoi correspond to the forming principles that are inherent in existence and which determine the essence of each thing and its basic natural properties and characteristics, as well as the purpose of its existence. Along with the universal logoi there are also logoi of individuals. All logoi form an ontological hierarchy, which determines the entire diversity of created beings, as well as their internal natural unity and various interrelationships between them. Invisible logoi, when scattered in the world, can become the object of rational knowledge, gradually leading a person to the knowledge of God and the union with God, that is, to deiication, which is the ultimate goal and divine plan for the created world. |
| Christus est;/O beata trinitas./g-on tertium sanctus est spiritus; sanctus spiritus totius exsistentiae demonstratio est;/Demonstratio autem numquam nisi nota demonstrat; nosse autem in divinis, hoc est quod habere est; cognoscentia enim ipsa eadem que substantia est;/Habet ergo deum, habet Christum, quem demonstrat sanctus spiritus;/O beata trinitas./ Inmensus, infinitus, invisibilis deus es, sed aliis inmensus, infinitus, aliis et invisibilis, tibi mensus, tibi finitus, tibi visibilis;/Hinc ergo et forma tibi est; ergo et g-logos idem es, quia g-logos forma est;/ Et quia forma tibi notitia es, notitia autem spiritus sanctus est, id ergo et deus et g-logos et spiritus sanctus es;/O beata trinitas./ Tu, fili, visibilis; es enim universalis et omnium forma; cum enim vivificas cuncta, fit forma de vita;/Forma autem semper in substantia et forma omnis notitia est;/Ergo in substantia deus es, in forma g-logos, in notitia spiritus sanctus;/O beata trinitas./ Tu quoque, spiritus sancte, notio es;/Omnis autem notio formae et substantiae notio est; cognoscis igitur deum et habes dei formam;/Hinc et deus et filius, spiritus sanctus es;/O beata trinitas./ Esse, deus, es;/Spiritum esse, Christus;/Apparere quod sit spiritus, paraclitus;/O beata trinitas./ Hinc Christum misit pater,/Christus paraclitum, Christus ut paraclito,/ Christo ut appareret pater,/O beata trinitas./ Secreta atque in occulto substantia, deus, es;/Secreta atque in occulto forma, deus, es;/Secreta atque in occulto notio, deus, es;/Hinc g-proon istorum g-mYn g-onmYn, deus, es;/O beata trinitas./ Publica iam apparens que substantia g-logos es; et quia publica et apparens, forma autem, quia patris forma es, hinc tibi substantia es;/ Ergo in te pater est, quia pater substantia est; eadem autem substantia, neque enim alia ulla substantia;/Si ergo g-logos apparens forma est, forma que ipsa substantia est, apparens autem forma apparens que substantia notio est, idem, tu g-logos, et deus et spiritus sanctus es;/ O beata trinitas./ |
| Non falletur ergo, si quis subintellexerit sanctum spiritum matrem esse Iesu et supra et deorsum, supra quidem, ut dictum, deorsum autem isto modo. Necesse fuit liberationis gratia omne divinum, hoc est seminarium spirituum omnium universaliter exsistentium et id quod est primum esse, hoc est universalem g-logon, ab inferiore hyle et corruptione omni incarnari in mortificationem omnis corruptionis et peccati. Tenebrae enim et ignoratio animae direptae ab hylicis potentiis eguerunt lumine aeterno in auxilium, ut g-logos animae et g-logos carnis, mysterio mortis detrusa[m] corruptione, in reviviscentiam et animas et carnes per sanctum spiritum administratorem ad divinas et vivefacientes intellegentias erigerent cognoscentia, fide, amore. Respondit igitur angelus Mariae et dixit ipsi: spiritus sanctus adveniet in te et virtus altissimi inumbrabit tibi. Haec duo in motu quae sunt g-logos et sanctus spiritus, ad id ut gravida esset Maria, ut aedificaretur caro a carne, dei templum et domicilium, advenerunt, sanctus quidem spiritus potentia in motu: generationis enim principium motus, virtus autem altissimi ipse g-logos est: virtus enim et sapientia dei g-logos Iesus. Sed de g-logYi, hoc est de filio, obumbrabit tibi dixit. Perfectum enim divinum et splendide, ut est clarum, non capit humana natura, et hoc significat: et g-logos caro factus est. Magis autem obumbrationem significat, quod dictum est: exinanivit semet ipsum. 59. Habemus ergo secundum ordinem permissu dei et patrem et filium g-homoousion et g-homoousia secundum identitatem in substantia. Una enim substantia spiritus. Is ipsum esse est. Ipsum esse autem et vita et intellegere est. Ista tria in singulis quibusque et ideo una divinitas et unum quod omne, unus deus, quia unum, pater, filius, sanctus spiritus, secundum potentiam et actionem solum apparente alteritate, quod deus in potentia et in occulto motu movet et imperat omnia ut in silentio, g-logos autem filius qui est et sanctus spiritus, voce confabulatur ad generanda omnia, secundum vitam et secundum intellegentiam substituentia ad id quod est esse omnibus. |
| One must make, however, a distinction between knowledge of the presence of the principles of creation – that is, that there are the logoi that hold the creation – and the contemplation of the logoi as a special stage of an advanced spiritual development. If the former is probably accessible to discursive reason (through scientific research, for example), the latter requires one to have made an advance in religious contemplation, which is sustained by one’s participation in ecclesial life. When both knowledge of the existence of the logoi and their contemplation are combined in one human person, then science definitely can be said to participate in the contemplation of the logoi of creation. On average, however, it would be a modest task to demonstrate only the presence of the logoi in created being. On the relation of knowledge of the logoi to knowledge of the Logos, which holds them together, Maximus the Confessor asserts that the contemplative activity reflects the convergence of the logoi to the divine unity and the unifying intention of God and the Logos. The Logos is itself the many logoi, but then the logoi may be said to be the one and only Logos, although what we know of them and their variety does not exhaust what is contained in the Logos. Thus there is no complete identity. In addition, what we know about the logoi can contribute only to our knowledge of the Logos as the common source of their differentiated inhabitation in the created world. In other words, knowledge that the logoi exist does not provide itself the inference to the divine Logos, as the personal God of Christianity. The latter requires one to advance in apophatic mystical theology, that is, in religious life in God. The logoi of Creation and Antinomies Because natural contemplation of the logoi is not entirely based in discursive thinking, it is important to try to formulate an algorithm of demonstration of the presence of the logoi (not their contemplation) in the rubric of a purely discursive analysis of scientifico-philosophical affirmations about created nature. In a way, this task is quite paradoxical, for we are trying to discover through analysis of worldly things their logoi, the presence of the uncreated principles of the existence of created beings, which manifest that the ontological grounds of the worldly things studied by science are beyond the world and that everything in the world is rooted in its otherness. This is why these transcendent principles, if they exist, are present in scientific or philosophical arguments only in a hidden, mystical way. They can be revealed only from an a priori theological perspective and expressed in an apophatic and paradoxical way. |
| Quoniam autem causa ipsi est id in quo est, imago ipsa filius est eius in quo est, ineffabili generatione, et maxime ingenerabili generatione, aut magis semper generante generatione quod et Alexander dixit. Et dicitur: semper pater, semper filius simul exsistens. Ergo et semper consubstantialis, coexsistens, unum exsistens, in patre filius est. Cum autem operatur, procedit; cum procedit, in filio est pater. Quomodo autem istud, dicemus. Deus et g-logos unum est et unitum, et idcirco g-homoousion. Sed quod deus, iuxta quod deus est, eius quod et esse potentia est, et omnium quae sunt ad id quod est esse causa est. g-logos, iuxta quod g-logos est, paterna est potentia ad subsistere facere ipsum quod est esse, principale ipsum quod est esse, et principium et perfectio. Ab eo enim quod est esse universale et supra universale, omne universale esse et iuxta genera et iuxta species esse et individua quod est esse illis habet. Si igitur g-logos habet esse – est enim g-logos id ipsum quod est esse ipsi – et g-logos ergo ex illo quod est supra universale esse esse est. Sed universale quod est esse g-logos est. Deus autem id quod est supra universale esse. Filius autem quod est universale esse. Pater ergo supra universale quod est esse. g-homoousion ergo in eo quod est esse ad id quod est esse, et quod supra universale ad universale. Hoc autem et progressio est: ab eo enim quod est supra universale universale egreditur, et magis certe intellegenti, et egreditur et manet; non enim derelinquitur universale. Ergo et subsistit per semet ipsum quod est universale, et intus est in eo quod est supra universale; conexum ergo est et inseparatum est. Et istud luminis refulgentia dicitur, omnia luminis habens, sed non accipiens, neque enata, sed connaturalis, et g-homoousios semper exsistens. Non igitur motu locali neque inmutatione. Inmutabilis enim pater et inmutabilis filius, et semper pater, semper filius, etiam si filius credatur in patre imago exsistens et eius quod est esse forma, sicut dictum est, sive iuxta progressum refulgentia luminis filius est. |
| Nos tamen inpassibilem et filium dicimus iuxta quod g-logos est; iuxta quod autem caro factus est, passibilem. At vero miseratio et ira et gaudium et tristitia et alia huius modi ibi non sunt passiones, sed natura et substantia. Si igitur spiritus beneolentia, ipse per se optimus quibusdam in vitam, quibusdam in mortem est, non sua natura mutatus, sed patientium materia et voluntate, sic natura[m] inmutabili divinitas pro accipientibus aut ut oportet aut aliter adfici dicitur vel pati, quoniam a nostris sensibus quae divina sunt aestimamus. In sensibilibus enim, iuxta quod animal est animal, hoc est anima utens corpore vel corpus animatum, iuxta sensum pati dicitur; vere autem, neque per semet solius animae sunt passiones; multo magis spiritus, g-logou et dei. Inpassibilis enim divina natura est. 45. Discedant ergo Patripassiani, quoniam nos et patrem dicimus et filium, ipsum solum passibilem iuxta motum in hyle. Discedant Arriani, quoniam nos natura filium dicimus ante omnem creaturam genitum. Discedant et g-apo g-tou g-ontos dicentes Christum esse, quod a deo factus sit qui deus g-on est. Nos enim filium dicimus natura et a patre ipsum esse et in patre. Discedant Marcelli et Photini discipuli; ipsum enim g-logon dicimus in carne fuisse, non aliud g-logon esse et aliud hominem, in quo Christum dicunt esse, sed ipsum g-logon carnem induisse. Illi enim dicunt esse et deum et g-logon et spiritum, quartum autem filium, id est hominem, qui ex Maria, quem adsumpsit g-logos et ut ministrum rexit, cui homini dicunt et sedem paratam esse. Exciderunt ergo a trinitate. Si autem manet trinitas sola, ipse homo et g-logos, quem g-logon nos supra filium demonstravimus. Non autem hoc significat: et g-logos caro factus est, corruptus g-logos in carnem conversus est, sed g-logos per quem effecta sunt omnia et omnia effectus et caro factus est, ut in carne cum esset, totum hominem sua passione et morte iuxta passiones corporis mercaretur. Si enim non erat ipse homo de Maria, quare exinanivit semet ipsum, et quid est: formam servi accipiens, et quid rursus est: et g-logos caro factus est? |
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