| Although the extant literature of some Jewish groups (e.g., the Essenes) employed hypostasis or personification less than others, 3039 hypostatization or personification occurs frequently enough in Jewish texts to provide a context for interpreting Johns use of Logos in his prologue. 3040 While OT depictions of the Word by themselves probably do not constitute an adequate explanation of the Johannine prologue, 3041 OT personifications (usually not hypostatizations) of the Word or expressions of its activity in creation are significant. 3042 Although we will return to this issue in our comment on John 1:3 , it is important to note that ancient Israelite texts could easily be understood as identifying the divine word in creation with the divine word of Scripture ( Ps 33:4,6, 9 , ll). 3043 The Word may also be personified in second-century B.C.E. 1 Enoch, a work of Palestinian provenance. 3044 The Wisdom of Solomon is clearer: God " s all-powerful Logos came down from heaven to slay the first-born immediately before the exodus. 3045 Rabbinic texts sometimes personified the Word 3046 (). The rabbinic mystic work 3 Enoch objectifies the Word of God as Dibburiel, one of Metatron " s seventy names. 3047 The «progressive hypostatization of the Word in Judaism» 3048 may well include the Memra concept of the Targumim as one illustration. The Logos title for Jesus became prominent in ante-Nicene Christianity, probably mainly through John " s usage, though Philo also influenced writers» perspectives and vocabulary once they had the term. 3049 «Logos» often appears for the Son in Trinitarian formulas from the second century. 3050 Ignatius depicts Jesus as God " s «eternal Word»; 3051 the Epistle to DiognetuSy possibly from the mid-second century C.E., also calls him the Logos. 3052 Tatian describes the Logos as the Father " s first-begotten, as the beginning and creator of the world. 3053 A title so rich in theological and cosmological antecedents naturally lent itself to apologetic exploitation by early Christian philosophers. Justin Martyr (mid-second century) contends for Jewish hearers that the divine Word is personal, not inanimate, 3054 and finds them agreeable. 3055 He argues for Greeks that the Logos who condemned false gods through Socrates later came as Jesus Christ. 3056 Although Justins source has been disputed 3057 –he rarely depends on the Fourth Gospel–the Christian Logos tradition in which he stands is probably either related to or derived from the Fourth Gospe1. 3058 In the next generation Tertullian explicitly cites the Logos of Zeno and Cleanthes as identical with Christ. 3059 |
| Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses. Leiden, 2001; Williamson R. Philo " s Logos Doctrine// Idem. Jews in the Hellenistic World. Camb., 1989. Vol. 1. Pt. 2: Philo. P. 103-143; Hannah D. D. Michael and Philo " s Logos Doctrine// Idem. Michael and Christ: Michael Traditions and Angel Christology in Early Christianity. Tüb., 1999. S. 76-92; Siegert F. Der Logos, «älterer Sohn» des Schöpfers und «zweiter Gott»: Philons Logos und der Johannesprolog//Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums. Tüb ., 2004. S. 277-293; Radice R. Logos tra stoicismo e platonismo: Il problema di Filone//Dal logos dei greci e dei romani al Logos di Dio. Mil., 2011. P. 131-145; Л. в НЗ: Rendel H. J. Stoic Origin of the Fourth Gospel//BJRL. 1922. Vol. 6. N 4. P. 439-451; Bultmann R. Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen und manichäischen Quellen für das Verständnis des Johannesevangeliums//ZNW. 1925. Bd. 24. S. 100-146; idem. Untersuchungen zum Johannesevangelium//Ibid. 1930. Bd. 29. S. 169-192; idem. Der Begriff des Wortes Gottes im Neuen Testament// Idem. Glauben und Verstehen. Tüb., 1933. Bd. 1. S. 268-293; idem. Jesus and the Word. N. Y., 1958; idem. The Gospel of John: A Commentary. Oxf., 1971; Hadidian Y. H. Philonism in the Fourth Gospel//The Macdonald Presentation Volume: A Tribute to D. B. Macdonald. Princeton; L., 1933. P. 211-222; Dürr L. Die Wertung des göttlichen Wortes im Alten Testament und im antiken Orient, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des neutestamentlichen Logosbegriffes. Lpz., 1938; Hamp V. Der Begriff «Wort» in den aramäischen Bibelübersetzungen: Ein Exegetischer Beitrag zur Hypostasen-Frage und zur Geschichte der Logos-Spekulationen. Münch., 1938; Schnackenburg R. Das Johannesevangelium. Lpz., 1966. Tl. 1; Aland K. Eine Untersuchung zu Joh 1 3. 4: Über die Bedeutung eines Punktes//ZNW. 1968. Bd. 59. N 3/4. S. 174-209; Fascher E. Vom Logos des Heraklit und dem Logos des Johannes// Idem. Frage und Antwort: Studien zur Theologie und Religionsgeschichte. |
| Et spiritus sanctus exposuit et de Christo, sicuti dicit salvator in evangelio secundum Iohannem: sanctus spiritus, quem mittet pater in meo nomine, ipse vos docebit omnia. Si igitur sic sunt ista, didicimus et patrem et filium et in sanctis scripturis et a spiritu, quem doctorem habet fide sanctus vir. 3. Dicamus igitur scripturas et primum secundum Iohannem. Dicit enim, quoniam g-logos et in principio erat et circa deum erat et quoniam deus erat g-logos. Numquid de alio dicit g-logon? Omnino de filio. Quid ergo? g-logos si ex nullo est subiecto, quomodo g-logos potentiam habet, ut per ipsum creentur omnia, ipse qui sit ex nullo subiecto? Inpossibile enim semen esse omnium quae sunt, quod ex nihilo factum est. Deinde si in principio erat, quoniam principium, secundum quod principium est, sine principio est, qui erat in principio, erat semper. Quae igitur audacia, quae blasphemia non erat aliquando dicere, toties Iohanne dicente: erat g-logos in principio, erat ad deum, erat deus g-logos ipse, erat hic in principio ad deum? Licet enim erat praeteriti temporis significationem habeat frequenter non sine principio, sed hic sine principio accipiendum, quoniam dixit: in principio erat. Quod et vos significatis ante tempora, ante aeones dicentes. Omnia, dicit, per ipsum facta sunt et sine illo effectum est nihil. Etenim sine g-logYi quid est, quod, ut sit, accipiat? Solus enim g-logos, secundum quod g-logos est et sibi et aliis, ipsum quod est esse praestat omnibus quae sunt. Et idcirco aequalis quidem patri – causa enim principalis et sibi et aliis causa est et potentia et substantia causa exsistens – praecausa autem pater. Unde filius distabit hoc, quod movetur et operatur in manifestationem, propter magnam divinitatem nobis incognoscibiliter operante patre. Supra enim beatitudinem est pater et idcirco ipsum requiescere. Operari enim, etiamsi in perfectionem operetur, in molestia motus. Ista beatitudo est secundum quod est operari perfecta. 4. Audi igitur et aliud! Quod est esse pater est, quod est operari g-logos. |
| The evolutionary view of the cosmos assumes that the ground of objective reality is matter-energy. The vision of Maximos is grounded in the metaphysical hierarchy of being. Axiom #2 of Maximos might read: Everything that exists is a visible and sensible image of an invisible and intelligible Archetype. Since the created world is rooted in the Logos as Origin and End, the sacred cosmology of Maximos would oppose the evolutionary paradigm’s axiom of the random basis of motion and change with the idea of the purposive nature of motion in all created beings as the aspiration implanted by God in each created nature to move toward its consummation in Christ. The world-image of Maximos is radically teleological; that of evolutionism a denial of teleology. Evolution as transformism of species is denied in the Maximian cosmology by the preexistent logoi fixed in God and coming to existence as qualified substances in the sensible world in harmony with God’s creative intentions. The well-known logos/tropos distinction, which Maximos uses so effectively in his Trinitarian and Christological theology, is radically anti-evolutionist and, at the same time, provides a precise expression of the relationship between the stability of created kings and the variation within species actually observed in nature. Logos phuseos is the essential nature of the creature which is fixed in God as the immutable inner essences of created beings preexistent in the Divine Logos and manifested in the sensible world as incarnate forms. Tropos hyparxeos is the mode of existence of created beings which permits considerable variation within the strict limits of the logos of nature, and also accounts for the dimension of freedom and individuality in the created order. Maximos expresses this decisively in Amb. 42 : Every innovation, to speak generically, has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the logos of nature; because a logos innovated corrupts the nature, as not retaining adulterated the logos according to which it exists; but the mode innovated, the logos being preserved in its nature, manifests miraculous power. |
| Other Jewish texts in Greek employ Hellenistic philosophical terminology, although generally in a less self-conscious manner than Philo. 2984 Hengel finds the Platonic idea of the «world-soul» (later adapted by Stoicism) in the LXX of Prov 8:22–31 . 2985 The Letter of Aristeas invokes «the natural reason» (τν φυσικν λγον) to explain biblical law, which he considers a manifestation of reason; 2986 the second chapter of 4 Maccabees identifies the law with reason (λογισμς). 2987 Earlier Hellenistic Jewish writers also attributed creative activity and the light at creation to Wisdom. 2988 At least some Diaspora Jews on a popular level personified the Law, entreating its power alongside God " s. 2989 The prevalence of the Logos concept in Hellenistic thought suggests the likelihood that other Hellenistic Jewish thinkers besides Philo would have exploited the concept, although Philo is our primary sample of Hellenistic Jewish philosophy. The same prevalence indicates that Philo may be used to illustrate one position on the spectrum of Logos " s semantic range, without postulating dependence. Most scholars today deny direct dependence, although some will nevertheless argue for a close relationship based on a common stream of thought. 2990 Thus, for example, Albright and Goodenough feel that John " s Logos conception is «more primitive» than Philós and attribute both to a common source. 2991 The value of Philós witness to the term " s usage should not be rejected a priori; 2992 certainly no one today would reject the value of Philo by asserting that a Palestinian Jew like John would not be open to foreign thought, as a writer in 1850 contended! 2993 How closely does Philós use of Logos approach John " s on the term " s semantic range? Merely dismissing his relevance because his Logos is «impersonal» is unhelpful and not entirely accurate; 2994 as noted above, his Logos is often enough personified, and possibly viewed as no less personal than the God for whom he mediates. Like Palestinian Judaism, Hellenistic Judaism did have a personified Logos or Wisdom tradition. 2995 While John " s Logos as a historical person certainly differentiates John from Philo, 2996 it also differentiates him from every other extant non-Christian source of Mediterranean antiquity. |
| Ergo haec: g-logos, g-pneuma, supra animam sunt sua superiore substantia, longe alia substantia animae et inferiore, quippe a deo insufflata et genita et sola vere substantia dicta, quod subesset suis in se speciebus, et eodem pacto ut hyle. 12. Huc accedit quod vita deus, vita Christus et ex se vita utique, sed ut, patre dante, Christus habeat ex se vitam. Ergo vita superior ab anima. Prior enim g-zYU et g-zYomUs, id est vita et vitalitas, quam anima. Ergo illa g-homoousia, deus et g-logos, pater et filius, quippe ut ille spiritus et hic spiritus, et hic vita et ille vita, item verbum et verbum et cetera. Spiritus igitur habet potestatem animam sumendi, ponendi et resumendi. Etenim vita et a se vita potestatem habet sumendi, ponendi illud quod sua potentia, sui participatione, facit vivere. Etenim anima ad imaginem imaginis dei facta: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo inferior et a deo atque g-logYi magis orta vel facta, numquam ipse deus aut g-logos, sed quidam g-logos, non ille qui filius, generalis vel universalis atque omnium quae per ipsum facta sunt semen, origo, fons. Illius vero g-logos anima quomodo aut qui, et dixisse memini et suo loco esse dicturum. Ergo universalis, quia spiritus et vita, non anima, habet potestatem a semet ipso animam ponere et rursum animam sumere. Deus igitur et g-logos, vel quia vita sunt, vel quia spiritus, vivunt et semper vivunt, quippe qui a se vivunt. Ergo illa g-homoousia. Anima vero g-homoiousios. Haec, cum adsumitur a divinis – id est a g-logYi; neque enim a deo, g-logos enim motus est, et motus anima, et motus a semet ipso motus, unde imago et similitudo anima g-tou g-logou est – ergo, cum adsumitur, nihil adicitur vitae, quippe cum ex vita, id est ex vivendi potentia, animae vita sit. Animam igitur cum adsumit spiritus, veluti ad inferiora traicit potentiam atque actiones, cum mundum et mundana complet. Ergo spiritus, et maxime g-logos, spiritus qui vita est, in potestate habet et sumere animam et ponere. |
| After the 4th-century refutation of Apollinaris, this schema was extensively rejected from the writings of the fathers, though it can be discerned in many patterns of proto-Christian writings, especially of the heterodox type. To envisage that the Word of God enters the “flesh” of Jesus of Nazareth is often called in modern textbooks a Logos- Sarx Christology. It implies something of a fundamental contrast between categories of “divinity” and “flesh” (standing in for “God and creature”). This Logos-Sarx theology was witnessed in early christological schemes, most radically in the Gnostic Docetics who could not accept any fundamental connection between the Logos and a “fleshly” reality which they saw as profane. More sophisticated Logos-Sarx thinking can be seen vividly in Apollinaris of Laodicea, who thought that the intellectual power of the Logos of God “stood in” for the human powers of reason in Jesus. When the Logos entered flesh, therefore, it had no need of a human mind or soul, itself providing for those basic functions. Apollinaris thought that this was a useful way of insisting on the single personality of the Divine Word in the figure of the Incarnate Christ, but his opponents such as the Cappadocian fathers soon answered that it was a highly defective Christology since it rendered the humanity of Christ mindless and soulless (cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 101 to Cledonius). From the beginning, Christian acceptance of the scheme of incarnation was widespread, with several variants in early times. Most writers before the 3rd century do not think about it in great detail, concerned only when extremes appeared, such as the denying of the full reality of either the human or divine character of the Christ. After the 3rd century the particular issues of incarnationalism become more and more specified, and turn mainly on the issue of the problem of a coherent subjectivity: in what way could a divine being (the Logos) be a human being? The Greek fathers generally used a broader range of terms than incarnation and thus the simple and singular application of the English word commonly falsifies their varied senses. |
| S. Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory – The Search for the Fundamental Laws of Nature. Теория логоса (LOGOS THEORY) Древнегреческое слово logos происходит от legó («я говорю»). Logos означает «слово, речь, объяснение, принцип, разум». В древнегреческой философии концепция логоса имела различные значения. Гераклит считал, что это рациональный закон, управляющий мирозданием. Анаксагор видел в нём разумное начало мироздания, хотя, как и °Платон, называл его nous («разум»). Для стоиков логос был принципом всякой рациональности в мироздании. Однако незадолго до того, как был написан Новый Завет, иудейский философ °Филон Александрийский (28 до Р. Х. – 45 по Р. Х.) описывал логос как образ Божий, отличный от Бога и служащий посредником между Богом и миром (Edwards, «Logos»). Позже, в третьем столетии, °Плотин трансформировал logos или nous в эманацию низшего уровня, исходящую от Единого (Бога). Такое понимание логоса на низшем, по сравнению с Богом, уровне побудило некоторых отцов Церкви, в том числе ° Оригена , приписывать Христу не совсем полную божественность. Это стало основой для арианской ереси, которой противостоял Афанасий (Александрийский; см. Христос: божественная сущность). Как полагают некоторые учёные, в Евангелии от Иоанна ( Ин. 1:1 ) заимствовано такое греческое понимание логоса, и поэтому оно не учит о полной божественности Христа. Нет, однако, никаких причин думать, будто бы Иоанн под логосом понимает нечто низшее по сравнению с Богом. Иоанн ясно и твёрдо провозглашает, что «Слово [Logos] было Бог» ( Ин. 1:1 ; см. также Ин. 8:58; 10:30; 20:28 ). У Иоанна Логос есть личностное существо (Христос), тогда как в греческом мышлении это безличностное рациональное начало. У Иоанна «Слово [Logos]» обозначается личными местоимениями, такими как «Оно» ( Ин. 1:2 ) и «Его» ( Ин. 1:14 ). К древнегреческому логосу это не относится. Согласно Иоанну, Слово «стало плотью» ( Ин. 1:14 ). Совмещать logos (разум) или nous (рассудок) с плотью для греческого мышления было неприемлемо. |
| In the Logos doctrine of St. Maximos, there are three fundamental ”moments,” corresponding to the three major themes in the Christian redemptive tradition: Creation, Incarnation, Resurrection. But for Maximos, creation, incarnation and resurrection are not separate acts of God, neither by nature nor in time, but are simultaneous aspects of all God’s creative acts. P. Nellas has observed that Maximos seems to be working with an ”alternative conception” of time. This is a highly significant observation. The meaning of time in the thought of Maximos has not been given much attention. The whole tenor of the Confessor’s thought aspires to the contemplation of things from the Godward standpoint. Hence, the notion of time will have a radically different value than that of the earth-bound conceptualizing characteristic of the scientific paradigm. From the Godward perspective of Maximos, simultaneity will predominate over sequentiality, and time will be seen to possess no ”substantiality” at all. Because of this theocentric perspective, we might also observe that Maximos possesses an “alternative conception” of causality. A ”cause” for Maximos is not merely an event prior in time to its effect, as it is in the contemporary zeitgeist; rather a cause is whatever provides a reason (logos) for the existence, development and fulfillment of anything else, without the notion of time entering in at all. Such an understanding of causality is intimately connected to the concept of telos in Maximos. His worldview is profoundly and completely teleological. In Amb. 7 , Maximos defines telos as “that for the sake of which all things are, though itself for the sake of nothing.” By contrast, the modern evolutionary paradigm is consciously anti-teleological and time itself is a quasi-absolute metaphysical category. Thus, in the Logos doctrine of St. Maximos, creation, incarnation and resurrection are indissolubly united. Every act of God is creation through the Logos, incarnational in the Logos and, potentially, resurrection of the Logos (this last, in Maximos, is linked with deification and true gnosis ). It is precisely Maximos’ conception of the identity of creation and incarnation in the Logos that makes it impossible to reconcile his doctrine of creation with the concept of evolution. The following analysis of the Logos doctrine and its implications will hopefully make this clear. |
| 4 . All the negative statements in patristic literature regarding cosmic matter and the human body are not of an ontological but a purely ascetical character. They demand close contextual reading for a proper assessment of their theological content. 5 . The works of the fathers of the Alexandrian and Cappadocian schools repeatedly refuted the false anthropological position of Origen, especially on the question of the resurrection of the body. Of central importance in their theological formulations was the fruitful experience of the full dogmatic account of the Incarnation with the divination of human nature and the resurrection of the flesh. Common also to all members of the schools was the commitment of Eucharistic realism with the characteristic identification of the historical and Eucharistic flesh of Christ defined as the salvific ‘medicine’, ‘conveyor of life’ (τ λεξιτριον, πρξενος), the ‘god-inspired’ (θεοφορεται), 20 the ‘God-bearer’ (θεοφρος), 21 the ‘holy and life-giving’ ( γα σρξ; ζωοποις). 22 6 . The orthodox understanding of St. Paul’s expression of the ‘spiritual body’ ( 1Cor 15. 44 ) is articulated. It is not about fending off the body or the flesh but discarding the sin and carnal and mundane mindset. The renovation of human body (as well as of all the creation) by the grace of God upon resurrection will take place with the preservation of the logos by which it was endowed at the creation. Due to synthetic manner of analyzing of the heritage of St. Maximus, we have been able to highlight the concept of ‘the logos of the event’ into his theological apparatus. This concept is represented in the similar formula of the ‘Providential logos’ (τν πρνοιαν λγος), 23 as well as the formula of ‘the logos of the accomplished’ (τν γινομνων λγος) 24 in the original writings by Rev. Maximus the Confessor and especially matters in proper understanding of the holy Eucharist. In this case, the logos of the sacrament is the transformation of the logos of wine and bread into the logos of flesh and blood of the Incarnated Logos – i. e. into the Incarnated Logos Himself in His godly and human nature. |
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