| The history of the terms “substance” (οσα) and “hypostasis” is extremely complicated. In particular there exists the opinion with regard to the use of these terms in the trinitarian theology of the Greek Fathers that the distinction between substance and hypostasis had been made possible on the basis of the logical distinction of Aristotle between “primary substance” and “secondary substance” (Categories 5, 2a, 11 – 16; Metaphysics VII, 11, 1037a 5). According to this opinion the Cappadocian Fathers in their trinitarian theology identified the term “hypostasis” with the “primary substance” (the individual and concrete), and the term “substance” with the “secondary substance” (the general and common) of Aristotle. See, for example, G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (1936), p. 245 ff., J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (1950), p. 243 ff. and K. Oehler, op. cit. p. 23 ff. But this opinion appears very debatable upon a close study of the Greek Fathers (e.g. for Athanasius see note 24 above), from whose thought the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substance seems to be entirely absent. It is also doubtful whether this distinction represents even Aristotle’s thought correctly, as an outstanding specialist observes. See D.M. Mackinnon, “Substance in Christology – A Cross-bench View,” Christ, Faith and History: Cambridge Studies in Christology, ed. S.W. Sykes and J.P. Clayton (1972), pp. 279 – 300. A relationship between the development of these terms and the history of the philosophical sense of the term ποκεμενον in the period after Aristotle appears probable. Because of the double meaning which Aristotle seems to accord this term (ποκεμενον is [a] matter and [b] concrete and independent being; see Metaphysics VII, 3, 1029a), in the period after Aristotle the term “hypostasis” displaces the term ποκεμενον because of the materialistic sense of the latter and itself assumes the meaning of concrete and independent being. Thus in the first centuries of the Christian era the term “hypostasis” gradually acquired the meaning of real and concrete being in opposition to that which is merely apparent and evanescent. This evolution seems to have been brought about mainly by the Stoics (cf. E. Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen III p. 644 ff.), Cf. on this C.C.J. Webb, op. cit. Granted that the influence of Stoicism in the Philosophy of the patristic period is strong, it is probable that the use of the term “hypostasis” for the expression of concrete (as opposed to general) being should have had the ground prepared for it in this way. It remains a fact, however, that the theological thought of the Cappadocians brought about a radical change in the philosophical use of these terms. |
| without its being qualified with the term Father, calling it the way of thinking “of the Greeks” (λλνων ρμηνεαι). But “Father” is by definition a relational term (no father is conceivable without a son), and it is precisely this that makes the use of “substance” by Athanasius un-Greek. It is clear that we have here the emergence of a new ontology (cf. below). 131 In his profound analysis of Aristotle " s idea of substance, Prof. D.M. Mackinnon (“Aristotle’s Conception of Substance,” in R. Marbrough, ed., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, pp. 97 – 11a) has revealed to us the subtleties of this idea in Aristotle, and it would be extremely wise for historians of doctrine to take these seriously into their consideration. See also his “Substance in Christology: A Crossbench View,” in S.W. Sykes and J.P. Clayton, eds., Christ, Faith and History (Cambridge Studies in Christology, 1972), pp. 279 – 300. 132 See G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic thought (1936), p. 245 f., and J.N.D, Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (1950), p. 243f. 133 Here Christian theology can benefit considerably from E. Levinas’ remarkable work Totalité et Infini (1971). 135 The Cappadocians arrived at this through their thesis that no nature exists “in the nude” but always has its “mode of existence” (τρπος πρξεως) See e.g. Basil, Ep. 38:2, PG 45: 337. It is interesting to take up G.L. Prestige’s criticism (op. cit. p. 233) of St Basil’s idea that in God there is a coincidence between nature and person. This, he says, makes it hard to defend the unity of the Godhead, because it implies a shift of the meaning of substance from the sense of primal substance into that of secondary substance. But this shows precisely why the application of this distinction becomes questionable in the case of the Greek Fathers. 137 The homousion presupposes that ousia represents the ultimate ontological category. There seems to be no doubt that this is the view of Athansius. If, however, we take into account the relational character of ousia in Athanasius, we can conclude that the Cappadocians do not depart from Athanasius’ thought but simply draw the consequences that Athanasius’ theology had for the doctrine of God’s being. Athanasius’ relational notion of substance becomes through the creative work of the Cappadocians an ontology of personhood. 138 It is true that philosophers of the Platonic, Neoplatonic and Gnostic schools spoke of a “departure” (κδημα) of beings, some of them using the prefix πρ in their vocabulary. But the significant thing is that for these philosophers, the “departure” was not a movement beyond the nous, but always a movement away from other things to enable the nous to arrive at its pure state. (It is in this sense that we must understand also the well-known phrase πκεινα τς οσας). |
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